Who shall live when all cannot live? In broad terms, this question is being answered implicitly, when politicians, physicians, and others make judgements and routine decisions about allocation of medical care to regions, types of diseases, hospitals, and individuals. Nevertheless, the dramatic forms of scarce life-saving medical devices (SLMD) such as hemodialysis and organ transplants compel us to examine some of the troubling ethical issues that are lurking behind myriads of routine decisions.
A significant example of the distribution of scarce medical resources is the use of penicillin, shortly after its discovery, among the soldiers in the North African front during the Second World War (Beecher,1969) . The available supply could be used to treat a few hundred badly wounded soldiers or it could be used in light doses for several thousands who were out of action because of venereal disease caught in brothels during rest and recreation. The policy in frontline stations is to give priority of treatment to those with slight conditions rather than severe wounds. Apparently, such a decision is based on the utilitarian notion of greatest good for the greatest number.
What set of criteria should be adopted for SLMD cases? Actually, two separate questions are involved here. One, what criteria are to be used and, second, who is to make the decision. The first is basic, because without answering that we cannot get to the second one. Some preliminary screening can be made by experts to determine "medical acceptability." While the medical criteria are not beyond debate, we have little to contribute on that issue. Once the pool of medically acceptable applicants has been selected but found to be too large for the available facilities, how should the final selection be made?
Market Solution
A strictly economic approach would suggest that ability to pay should decide who gets the treatment. Just as in the case of any other good or service, free market forces would, it can be argued, allocate the resource in the most efficient manner, without involving any questionable value judgements This line of argument does not take us too far. We are not dealing with a free market framework. The person "demanding" care is often not in a position to forgo or postpone the purchase of the "product" like in the case of a Lear jet or a Mercedes. Moreover, most, if not all, of the institutions "supplying" the product are not in the business just for making profits for their stockholders. So, the usual economic calculus of a welfare-maximizing competitive system does not provide an appropriate framework for decision-making about allocation in our case (Arrow, 1963; Culyer, 1971; Lindsay, 1969) .
Social Worth
Another criterion that can be advanced in helping to make the final selection is the social value of the recipients. The patient's probable and potential contribution to society is stressed. Often, the magnitude of such potential is gauged based upon the current web of social relationships, roles, and functions. For example, the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center is said to have considered such factors as church membership and scout leadership in making its selections (Alexander, 1962) . Without having to go too much into particulars, one has to ask a fundamental question: How do we determine social value? Shatin (1967) suggests that we go by what people regard as desirable values. He suggests that we conduct a poll to discover the values most cherished by most people and use them as the basis for SLMD selection. Presumably, the verdict of a majority is what would count. One can argue about the voting procedure regarding its validity. Even granting that it is acceptable, nothing prevents valuation from changing over time. Today's draft-dodger may be tomorrow's patriot. Another serious problem with Shatin's proposal is that the question of who the relevant people whose values we seek to discover are. Are they the members of a local community, city, the nation, or the world? The answer will surely differ depending on our sample. Whose answer do we choose? Finally, determining the worth of a person on the basis of social value alone seems to go against the cherished notions of the uniqueness of every individual person and the dignity of a human being.
Random Choice
Instead of economic or utilitarian criteria, we propose the use of some form randomness or chance as the basis of selection. It could either be a "first come, first served" type arrangement or a lottery. At first thought the use of chance seems cold and impersonal. It can be argued that it is a surrender to non-rationality when responsible decisions are what are called for. One can maintain, for example, that it is important to have persons rather than impersonal forces determining who shall live. Or, it can be argued that randomness is a surrender to "nonhuman" forces, vitiating human values. That is, human qualities like creativity of the individual ought to be considered and respected in making decisions.
However, such criticisms ignore an important moral element that is involved, favouring selection by randomness. Many previous suggestions of a random rule also ignore the moral element (see Ramsey, 1962, p. 245) . As Freund (1969, p. viii) 
remarks:
The more nearly total is the estimate to be made of an individual, and the more nearly the consequence determines life and death, the more unfit the judgement becomes for human reckoning. Randomness as a moral principle deserves serious study.
Serious study, we believe, would point to the implementation of randomness in some of the conflicting situations like the one we are addressing. By providing equality of opportunity it preserves personal dignity in a way no other criterion does. Thus, it cannot be easily dismissed as "non-rational" or "non-human." An individual's dignity, which on the utilitarian approach would be submerged in social role, can be protected by a recognition of the principle of equal opportunity to be saved from death. Random choice comes closer to preserving human dignity than the utilitarian calculus.
Another important value in medical practice is the relationship of trust between physician and patient. Trust is not simply the expectation of certain actions from the other but that the other will act in a particular way, respecting the person as an individual. Such trust cannot be preserved in life and death situations when a person knows that decisions would be made on social worth or value. A person rejected on grounds of inadequate social worth may be psychologically so devastated that even the betrayal of trust may not seem so important (Fletcher, 1968; Rescher, 1969) .
Occasionally, circumstances may arise that make it necessary to say that a particular person is practically indispensable for society at a particular juncture. In such cases, we may depart from the random rule, the burden of proof being on the claimants.
1 In any case, the reason for departure from randomness is based more on potential losses rather than potential gains. Thus, social value (negative) needs to be used as a standard of exception only.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the criteria for allocating extremely scarce life-saving devices and found that the arguments in favour of a market solution or solutions based on social worth are not very strong. We proposed a random selection procedure. While such a suggestion has already been made, we argue that it is justified not just on pragmatic grounds but also on moral grounds. We maintain that it preserves human dignity by providing for equality of opportunity. A patient who is denied access under a system of equal chances is more likely to accept the outcome than one who is denied access on the basis of some dubious notion of social worth, the determination of which does not even involve the patient.
1. The most prominent example, in this context, is that of India's national leader, Mr. J.P. Narayan. He was treated at the Seattle facility and the expenses were met by mostly voluntary contributions by people who believed in his worth for society.
